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Abstract
Following the approach recently developed for the International Wage Flexibility Project
(IWFP), the paper presents new estimates of downward real and nominal wage rigidity
for Hungary. Results suggest that nominal rigidity is more prominent in Hungary than
real rigidity. When compared to other countries participating in the IWFP, Hungary
ranks among the countries with the lowest degree of downward real rigidity. The esti-
mated downward nominal rigidity for Hungary is higher, the measure is close to but still
below the overall cross-country average. Using the same methodology, the paper also
con￿rms the widespread view that the wage growth bargained at the national level has
little compulsory power in Hungary. On the other hand, the minimum wage remains an
important source of potential downward wage rigidity in Hungary.
JEL classi￿cation: C23, E24, J3, J5
Keywords: Downward nominal and real wage rigidity, wage change distributions, wage
￿ exibility5
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Non-technical summary
In recent years there has been a growing interest in the extent of downward wage rigidity,
motivated by the concern that low in￿ ation might hamper the adjustment of relative
wages if workers are reluctant to accept reductions in their nominal wages. In a low
in￿ ation environment, workers￿ aversion to wage cuts may lead to higher and more
persistent unemployment, as employers are forced to layo⁄ workers in order to keep
costs low. It is not surprising then that a growing number of studies concentrate on
estimating the downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR) and the downward real wage
rigidity (DRWR) and their e⁄ect on the optimal in￿ ation or the real economy. One of
the most notable recent evidence on downward wage rigidity is the comprehensive work
of the International Wage Flexibility Project (IWFP), which initially involved over forty
researchers with access to micro level earnings data for 16 countries. Later, in the context
of the Wage Dynamics Network (WDN), new results using the same methodology were
produced for a number of European countries. The primary goal of the project was
to map and possibly to explain cross-country di⁄erences in DNWR and DRWR using
similar micro data and a common methodology for all countries.
Following the same approach, the present paper discusses new estimates of down-
ward real and nominal wage rigidity for Hungary. The estimated measures indicate the
fractions of workers who are potentially subject to downward nominal and downward
real wage rigidity, i.e. the fraction of those who would received nominal or real wage
freeze instead of nominal or real wage cut in the absence of rigidity. Results suggest that
nominal rigidity is more prominent in Hungary than real rigidity. The estimate of the
fraction of workers potentially a⁄ected by downward nominal wage rigidity is on average
0.344 while the average downward real rigidity estimate is 0.097. When compared to
other countries participating in the IWFP, Hungary ranks among the countries with
the lowest degree of DRWR. The estimated DNWR for Hungary is higher, the measure
is close to the overall cross-country average. Such combination of very low real rigid-
ity and moderate nominal rigidity places Hungary among countries with relatively high
wage ￿ exibility. However, the estimated measures say nothing about the speci￿c wage
component through which the adjustment takes place. Previous survey results suggest
that base wage is generally rigid and employers use regular and irregular bonuses to
adjust labour costs to shocks.
These results are consistent with the institutional background in Hungary. Based on
previous ￿ndings, downward wage rigidity is highly related to the speci￿c institutional6
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features of the countries. The Hungarian labour market is much less regulated than most
of the eurozone countries, which gives ￿rms a lot of freedom for adjustments. The wage
setting process is largely dominated by individual company or plant level agreements.
The coverage of industry-wide or occupational wage agreements is less than 40%, which
is very low in international comparison. The national level tripartite forum, the National
Interest Reconciliation Council (OrszÆgos ￿rdekegyeztet‰ o TanÆcs, O￿T) only provides
recommendations for wage increases and set the level of the legally guaranteed minimum
wage. The recommendation for the average wage growth is not legally binding nor is
it meant to be blindly followed. In fact, O￿T also recommends a minimum and a
maximum level of wage increases and suggests ￿rms and unions to set wage increases
within this range rather than automatically accepting the average value. The automatic
wage indexation mechanism - the principal source of DRWR - is practically unknown in
the country.
The paper also con￿rms the widespread view that the wage growth bargained at
the national level has little compulsory power in Hungary: the estimated proportion of
workers being subject to downward rigidity due to the bargained wage is close to zero.
On the other hand, the minimum wage is an important source of potential downward
wage rigidity: although at the time of writing the paper, the level of the minimum wage
in Hungary cannot be considered as excessive, the share of the workforce earning below
or close to the minimum wage is very high in international comparison.7
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1 Introduction
In recent years there has been a growing interest in the extent of downward wage rigidity,
motivated by the concern that low in￿ ation might hamper the adjustment of relative
wages if workers are reluctant to accept reductions in their nominal wages. The presence
of downward wage rigidity is particularly relevant in light of the increasing popularity of
implicit or explicit in￿ ation targeting systems adopted by central banks. The targeted
in￿ ation rate is very low in most of the industrialized countries, often 2% or less. In
such a low in￿ ation environment, workers￿aversion to wage cuts may lead to higher and
more persistent unemployment, as employers are forced to layo⁄workers in order to keep
costs low.
It is not surprising then that a growing number of studies concentrate on estimating
the downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR) and the downward real wage rigidity
(DRWR) and their e⁄ect on the optimal in￿ ation or the real economy. Early papers use
macro data to estimate wage rigidity. However, such studies are unable to di⁄erentiate
the e⁄ects of downward real and nominal rigidity from each other or from other concepts
of rigidity.
Since the beginning of this century, many researchers turned their attention to
individual-level wage data and found diverse results for di⁄erent counties. For instance,
Smith (2000) and Nickell and Quintini (2003) found much less evidence of DNWR in
the UK than in US, whereas Knoppik and Beissinger (2001) found substantial DNWR
in Germany. However, it was not clear whether these are di⁄erences in cross-country
variation or simply methodological di⁄erences.
The need for a clearer view on the growing number of unanswered questions gave
birth to the International Wage Flexibility Project (IWFP). It is a comprehensive multi-
country study which primarily aims at demonstrating the existence and measuring the
extent of downward nominal and real wage rigidity for continuing workers. Coordinated
by Erica Groshen (New York Federal Reserve) and William Dickens (Brookings Insti-
tution), the project initially involved over forty researchers with access to micro level
earnings data for 16 countries.
The ￿rst goal of the IWFP was to map and possibly to explain cross-country di⁄er-
ences in DNWR and DRWR using similar micro data and a common methodology for
all countries. The ￿rst ￿ndings of the project are summarized in Dickens et al. (2007).
The methodology is described in details in Dickens and Goette (2006). The participants8
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found notable di⁄erences in both real and nominal downward wage rigidities across coun-
tries. For instance, wage changes in Ireland are relatively ￿ exible, downward rigidity in
nominal or real wages are both low. For other countries like Netherlands, Greece or the
US, DNWR is an important factor, but not the DRWR. For Finland, Sweden and Por-
tugal, both downward real and nominal rigidity are considerable. The authors examined
a large set of institutional variables in order to explain these di⁄erences, but only union
density proved to be relevant in explaining downward real rigidity.
Later, the Wage Dynamics Network (WDN) gave a new impulse to the IWFP. While
the original IWFP included a large number of countries, the coverage of European coun-
tries was incomplete and, in some cases, the samples were very outdated. In the context
of the WDN, new results using the IWFP methodology were produced for Belgium
(Caju et al. (2009)), Luxembourg (L￿nnemann and Wintr (2009)), Spain (Messina
et al. (2010)) and for Hungary (this paper).
Last but not least, Messina et al. (2010) investigated sectoral di⁄erences in DRWR
and DNWR using the same IWFP methodology for four eurozone countries (Belgium,
Denmark, Portugal and Spain). They found that although downward wage rigidity
di⁄ers signi￿cantly across sectors, national factors dominate. The authors ￿nd evidence
of higher real wage rigidity for prime-age and white-collar workers in line with e¢ ciency
wage theories. Regarding structural factors a⁄ecting wage rigidities, they ￿nd that more
decentralized wage agreements is associated with a higher degree of real wage ￿ exibility.
In line with other studies conducted within the IWFP framework, this paper esti-
mates the measures of DNWR and DRWR for Hungary. These measures indicate the
fractions of workers who are potentially subject to downward nominal and real wage
rigidity. The analysis is motivated by several reasons. First, Hungary is the ￿rst CEE
country involved in the IWFP, which may provide an interesting point of comparison or
contrast to previous ￿ndings given the discrepancies in the institutional structures and
the economic background between this region and the other - mostly Western-European
- countries for which similar results are available. Second, the estimation results provide
valuable additional information about wage rigidity in Hungary, where the negative ef-
fects of downward nominal wage rigidity have been alleviated so far by the relatively high
in￿ ation history. In other words, it helps to explain the causes and predict the conse-
quences of wage rigidity during the current crisis when productivity dropped signi￿cantly
and in the hopeful future when price stability with low in￿ ation will be achieved in Hun-
gary. Accordingly, potential downward nominal and real wage rigidity is also of primary9
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concern for monetary policy in setting the optimal in￿ ation target. Finally, the research
provides useful input for any analysis on the costs and bene￿ts of Hungary￿ s eurozone
accession when the country loses its own monetary and exchange rates instruments and
adjustment through wages to negative shocks gain importance.
The methodology, summarized in the next section, follows the same approach as
in other IWFP papers, whereby resistance to nominal and real wage cuts is measured
through the di⁄erence between the observed individual wage change histogram and the
estimated counterfactual wage change distribution that would have prevailed under the
absence of rigidity. Section 3 presents the dataset I use, then Section 4 describes the
economic and institutional background and discusses wage ￿ exibility in Hungary based
on previous empirical research and the observed wage change distributions. Estimation
results are presented in Section 5. I also explore two other possible sources of downward
rigidity, namely the bargained wage growth at the national level tripartite forum, the
National Interest Reconciliation Council (Section 5.2) and the statutory minimum wage
(Section 5.3).10
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1372
August 2011
2 Econometric methodology
The methodology follows the approach developed for the IWFP, as described in details in
Dickens and Goette (2006). It is based on the following assumptions: (1) in the absence
of rigidity the distribution of wage changes would be symmetric, (2) the rigidity does not
a⁄ect wage changes above the median and (3) the symmetric (often referred to as notional
or counterfactual) wage change distribution is well approximated by a two-sided Weibull
distribution.1 The motivation behind using a two-sided Weibull distribution is that a
typical wage change distribution clearly diverges from the normal distribution even at
the right tail una⁄ected by rigidity: workers￿wage changes are tightly clustered around
the median change, which makes the distribution much more peaked with fatter tails
compared to the normal. Previous empirical ￿ndings show that the Weibull distribution
generally ￿ts well the histogram above the median. Once the notional distribution is
estimated, nominal and real wage rigidity are measured as the deviation of the observed
wage change histograms from the estimated notional wage change distribution that would
have prevailed under the absence of rigidity.
Figure 1 presents a hypothetical wage change distribution and the asymmetry caused
by downward wage rigidity. The left tail of the distribution shows that a fraction of
workers facing hypothetical wage cuts are subject to downward nominal rigidity and
experience a wage freeze instead. This e⁄ect leads to asymmetric histogram with fewer
wage cuts and a spike at zero. Similarly, a fraction of workers a⁄ected by downward real
wage rigidity are piled up in the histogram cell containing the (expected) rate of price
in￿ ation.
Based directly on the histogram, we can construct simple measures of downward
nominal and real wage rigidity without estimating the shape of the notional distribution.
These measures show the fraction of workers a⁄ected by downward nominal or real wage
rigidity, i.e. the fraction of those who received nominal or real wage freeze instead of
nominal or real wage cut. For downward nominal wage rigidity, this fraction is equal to
the ratio of the number of workers receiving no wage change to the total receiving no
wage change plus those receiving a cut. As for downward real wage rigidity, the concept is
















for x > ￿
with the three parameters allowing variation in the mean (￿), the dispersion (￿) and the peakedness
(￿).11
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also based on the asymmetry caused by the rigidity. In this case, the measure of DRWR
is the fraction of observations missing from the area below the expected in￿ ation rate as
compared to the equivalent area at the right hand side from the median, i.e. the part
starting from the median plus the distance between the median and the expected rate
of in￿ ation. However, in￿ ation expectations can di⁄er between ￿rms and individuals, so
there is no single point at which all workers subject to DRWR pile up. Assuming that
the distribution of expectations is symmetric, half of the workforce - for which in￿ ation
expectations are lower than the average - susceptible to DRWR will not be missing from
the area to the left of the mean expected rate of in￿ ation. Thus, we obtain a correct
measure of DRWR by multiplying the missing observations in the lower tail by two.2
Nevertheless, these simple measures are potentially subject to a number of biases, the
most important being bias due to measurement errors. Reporting and recording errors
create spurious variance in wage changes and false wage cuts. The IWFP method for
correcting for measurement errors is based on the ￿ndings of Abowd and Card (1989),
suggesting that all serial correlation in wage changes is due to measurement error. That
is, the methodology uses the assumption that any observed wage change which is com-
pensated the following year is an error.3
Using annual income data instead of monthly wages causes two additional problems.
First, if wage changes are not exactly synchronized with the period over which income
is observed the change in annual earnings from period t ￿ 1 to period t confounds wage
changes that took place during the period t￿1 with the one during the period t. Second,
it is easy to see that it creates a positive autocorrelation in the observed earning change
which contradicts the basic assumption of the error correction method. In order to
overcome these di¢ culties, Dickens and Goette (2006) modi￿ed the original version of
the error correction method and extended the methodology to annual income data. As
an additional moment condition, this procedure uses external information that gives the
fraction of wage changes normally taking place at di⁄erent months of the year. In our
case, this information comes from the Hey group survey.
2The mean expected rate of in￿ ation is estimated from a regression of the current year￿ s in￿ ation on
the previous year￿ s in￿ ation.
3Probably the best way to show the merits of the correction method is to use it on the Portuguese data.
This latter dataset contains two earning variables: a highly reliable base wage and a total earnings with
higher error rate. The error correction technique yields negligible correction to the one that measures the
base wage, but makes substantial correction to the earnings measure. After correction, the distribution
of earnings becomes very close to the distribution of base wage. For details about the method and its
assumptions, see Dickens and Goette (2006).12
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The Mixed method of Moments (MMM) estimates of downward nominal and real
rigidity consists of ￿tting a simple model of wage changes to the "true" distribution
corrected for measurement errors. The procedure jointly estimates the three parameters
of the symmetric two-sided Weibull distribution, the mean and the standard deviation
of the expected price in￿ ation rate as well as the share of workers a⁄ected by DNWR
and DRWR using a wide range of iterative optimization routines. The main advantage
of the MMM estimates of downward rigidity over the simple measures (even if computed
on the error-corrected histogram) is that the latter shows the fraction of workers actually
a⁄ected by downward rigidity. On the contrary, the model behind the MMM procedure
explicitly includes the probability of being subject to downward wage rigidity and thus
gives an explicit estimate for the fraction of workers potentially a⁄ected by downward
rigidity, independently of the level of price in￿ ation, productivity growth or any other
macroeconomic conditions.
3 The data
The database consists of the National Pension Insurance records of a random sample
of nearly 200000 individuals for the years 2000-2004. The ￿rst step of the sampling
process was to select a random sample of individuals, representative of the population
with respect to age, gender and geographical area for the year 2004. The database was
then completed with the selected individuals￿data for the previous years. The records
include information on annual income, the source of income (employee in private or
public sector, self employee, maternity leave, disability or other transfers...) and the
starting and ending date belonging to each speci￿c source. If a person has two or more
sources of income, parallelly or one after the other, the two sources and the corresponding
periods are recorded in separate cells.
I kept only employees in private sector with continuous employment status, that
is, individuals who have worked at least two whole consecutive years. As a result, the
sample size dropped to 48289 workers. I also excluded all minimum wage earners (or
who earn less than the statutory minimum wage) and ended up with an unbalanced panel
of 29003 workers. Although it is an important source of downward rigidity, excluding
minimum wage earners is crucial for at least two reasons. First, anecdotal evidence
and several empirical researches suggest that a large fraction of employees o¢ cially paid
at the minimum wage are remunerated by way of cash payment hidden from the tax13
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authorities in addition to the declared minimum wage. In each year, the histogram is
distorted by a false huge peak at the growth rate of the minimum wage, which may bias
the estimated parameters of the Weibull distribution.4 Second, as the minimum wage
was frozen in 2003 and it was raised by about the in￿ ation rate in 2004, therefore leaving
minimum wage earners in the data would lead to spurious DNWR in 2003 and DRWR
in 2004. It is probable that the adjustment takes place through the undeclared part of
the income, whereas the declared part (observed in the dataset) seems to be rigid. This
issue is further discussed in section 5.
4 What do we expect? - Some stylized facts
The period under investigation is characterized by high and quickly decreasing in￿ a-
tion, relatively stable labour productivity growth around 5% and a series of large-scale
economic policy shocks. In 2001, the crawling peg regime was replaced by in￿ ation tar-
geting system and an ambitious disin￿ ation strategy was announced. As a result, the
in￿ ation dropped from 9.2% to 4.7% in just two years but due to an increase in indirect
taxes, the in￿ ation raised to 6.8% in 2004. As the fast disin￿ ation took the agents by
surprise, in￿ ation expectations remained stuck at a high level at the beginning of the
period and adjusted only slowly afterward, which may have led to overly high nominal
wage agreements.
Beside the unexpected disin￿ ationary trend, two other policy measures have con-
tributed to the limited adjustment of nominal wages to the falling in￿ ation. First, the
minimum wage was nearly doubled in two steps in 2001 and 2002. Second, the sharp
wage increase in the public sector in 2002 (+29.2%) coupled with an increase in govern-
ment employment in 2002 (+1.5%) and 2003 (+3.3%) might also have fed through into
wages in the private sector. The strong upward pressure on wages has hit di⁄erent sectors
in di⁄erent ways and led to a new wave of economic restructuring from labour-intensive
towards capital-intensive industries.5
4This distortion is clearly visible during the two excessive hikes of the statutory minimum wage in
2001 (+57%) and 2002 (+25%). When minimum wage earners are included in the sample, the distortion
is so large that the estimation procedure does not converge for these years, the routine is unable to
produce results.
5The primary victims of the rise in labour costs were companies in the textile industry. Wage push
combined with the increasing competition from cheap Asian competitors forced more and more ￿rms to14
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Under these circumstances, the observed wage persistence may equally re￿ ect the ef-
fects of poorly anchored in￿ ation expectations, government-induced wage shocks and/or
rigid wages and macro data clearly cannot unambiguously discriminate between alter-
natives. Sluggish wage adjustment has always been a primary concern for the monetary
authority as so far nominal wage growth has never been consistent with the targeted
in￿ ation rate.6 On the other hand, real wages seemed to adjust quickly in periods of
economic stabilization: net real wages7 fell by a cumulative of 16% as a consequence
of the austerity measures introduced by the government in 1995-1996 and although real
wage growth remained positive after the second stabilization package in 2007, net real
wages fell again by 2% (see ￿gure 2)
The picture is clearer when looking at the micro data. Figure 3 presents the observed
and the true wage change distributions of workers between 2001 and 2004.8 Several
remarks are worthwhile.
First, note that the empirical distribution has heavier tails and it is less peaked than
the true distribution. The di⁄erence between the two distributions is generally limited
with good quality administrative data. This is the case with the Hungarian dataset as
well, although it seems that the correction engendered by the procedure is somewhat
higher compared to the case of previous similar administrative datasets used within the
IWFP, suggesting that recording errors are slightly more important in our case.
Second, the variance of wage changes is relatively high (Table 1), the distributions
have broader tails than it is in general in eurozone countries. The large variance is partly
the result of the absence of minimum wage earners from the sample. Furthermore, the
fairly high volatility of economic data in general is a characteristic feature of transitional
economies because of the quickly changing macroeconomic conditions and the higher
uncertainty surrounding the future. Previous empirical studies also suggest that changes
in workers￿wages are more related to ￿rm speci￿c shocks than in Western-European
countries. For example, KÆtay (2008) showed that unlike in Italy or Portugal, even
transitory productivity shocks translate into wage changes in Hungary. These ￿ndings
cut back on production, relocate operations or close down. Since early 2000, employment declined by
more than 60% in this industry.
6See any In￿ ation Report.
7Net real wage is de￿ned as the pay received by the employee after all taxes, pension insurance and
social insurance fees and other employee expenses have been substracted from the gross wage agreed
with the employer, divided by the consumer price index.
8The vertical lines denote current in￿ ation.15
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1372
August 2011
point towards relatively ￿ exible wages and give an explanation to the dispersed wage
change distribution.
Third, a ￿rst look at the distribution clearly displays an indication of DNWR but
reveals little evidence of DRWR. There is a visible spike at zero wage changes and a
missing mass of observations below it, but the modest spike and the limited asymmetry
around zero real wage change illustrate moderate DRWR. As shown in Table 1, the
proportion of wage cuts is relatively high, especially if we consider that the average
nominal wage growth as well as in￿ ation and productivity growth were considerably
higher in Hungary than in the eurozone and therefore the wage change distribution
was more shifted to the right. DNWR was less of a concern in 2001 and 2002, when
in￿ ation and/or in￿ ation expectations were stuck at a high level. The following two
years, in￿ ation expectations dropped considerably and, as a side e⁄ect, the fraction of
nominal wage freeze doubled: DNWR was at work. At the same time, the fraction of
wage cuts also increased, showing that a signi￿cant fraction of ￿rms are not reluctant
to cut nominal wages if needed.
There is, however, no sign to indicate signi￿cant DRWR. There are some small spikes
in the positive wage change histograms, but the asymmetry around the focal points is
limited. The graphs also show that the focal point lies around the in￿ ation rate in 2001
and 2004, but it seems to lie above the in￿ ation rate in 2002 and 2003, suggesting that
in these two years, in￿ ation expectations exceeded the realized level of in￿ ation.
All together, previous empirical research and micro data suggest that wage changes
are relatively ￿ exible, DNWR is moderate and DRWR is very small. These priors are
consistent with the institutional background in Hungary. Based on previous ￿ndings,
downward wage rigidity is highly related to the speci￿c institutional features of the
countries.9 The Hungarian labour market is much less regulated than most of the euro-
zone countries10, which gives ￿rms a lot of freedom for adjustments. The wage setting
process is largely dominated by individual company or plant level agreements. The
coverage of industry-wide or occupational wage agreements is less than 40%, which is
very low in international comparison. The national level tripartite forum, the National
Interest Reconciliation Council (OrszÆgos ￿rdekegyeztet‰ o TanÆcs, O￿T) only provides
recommendations for wage increases and set the level of the legally guaranteed minimum
wage. The recommendation for the average wage growth is not legally binding nor is it
9See e.g. Dickens et al. (2007) or Messina et al. (2008).
10For a full review of the Hungarian labour market institutions, see HorvÆth and Szalai (2008)16
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meant to be blindly followed. In fact, O￿T also recommends a minimum and a maxi-
mum level of wage increases and suggests ￿rms and unions to set wage increases within
this range rather than automatically accepting the average value. The automatic wage
indexation mechanism - the principal source of DRWR - is practically unknown in the
country.11
5 Results
Downward nominal and real wage rigidity are estimated using the IWFP routine.12 The
mean expected in￿ ation rate is estimated by a simple AR(1) model and the expectations
are allowed to ￿ uctuate between min(current in￿ation, past in￿ation, mean expected in-
￿ation) and max(current in￿ation, past in￿ation, mean expected in￿ation) +0.025 with
a maximal variance of 0.0036. The choice of these parameters relies on the speci￿cities of
the Hungarian economy: in a transitional country with high and volatile in￿ ation path,
expectations are likely to ￿ uctuate with rather high variance in a relatively large interval
compared to the case of stable economies. Therefore, I increased the upper boundary of
the expectations by 0.025 compared to the "baseline" routine and raised the maximal
variance from 0.000036 to 0.0036.13
However, two other possible sources of downward wage rigidity may interfere with
the results obtained in the previous estimation procedure. First, if the bargained wage
growth by the unions at the sectoral or national level - which is often higher than the
expected in￿ ation rate - is binding for the ￿rms, the focal point in the wage distribution
may lie above the expected rate of in￿ ation as ￿rms are forced to increase employees￿
wages at least by the bargained rate. In order to address this issue, I also estimated
the possible binding e⁄ect of the wage growth bargained at the National Interest Recon-
ciliation Council. I only focus on the national-level recommendation for wage increases
as the dataset I use does not include NACE codes and thus it cannot be linked to the
11In 2003, the O￿T agreed on real wage growth instead of nominal wage growth, but the agreement
remained a simple recommendation and wages have not been reviewed and updated later on depending
on the realized in￿ ation. Hence, even this unique case cannot be considered as wage indexation. This
was also the only year that no threshold was given around the recommended average wage increase.
12More precisely, I used the version updated on 15 November 2007.
13Without increasing the upper boundary, the routine gave unrealistically low values for the mean
expectations. In case if we leave the maximal variance at its baseline value, the routine is unable to
estimate the rigidity measures. Nevertheless, some robustness checks - not presented in this paper - show
that further increasing these two values does not change signi￿cantly the results.17
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wage increases bargained at the sectoral level. I used the same routine developed for
the IWFP, but instead of the expected in￿ ation rate, I used the wage development rec-
ommended by the National Interest Reconciliation Council as possible focal point and
explored its in￿ uence on individual wage agreements. The minimum and the maximum
recommended wage growth rates are used to set the boundaries of the interval in which
O￿T is expected to exert its impact.14 Results are presented in Section 5.2.
Second, the existence of the minimum wage creates an additional downward wage
rigidity missing from the estimated results. As the minimum wage is legally binding
for all workers and thus by de￿nition all workers are potentially a⁄ected by downward
rigidity, the same logic and the same IWFP routine cannot be applied here even if high
wage earners are unlikely to ever be in￿ uenced by the minimum wage. The number
of workers actually a⁄ected by the level or the increase in the national minimum wage
and the wage push engendered by the legislation depend on the actual macroeconomic
conditions and the share of the workforce earning below or close to the new minimum
wage agreed as a result of the tripartite bargaining process at the beginning of each year.
Nevertheless, it is an important source of potential downward wage rigidity that must
be taken into account.
5.1 Downward nominal and real wage rigidity
Figure 4 reports simple measures computed on the empirical and the true distributions
together with the MMM estimates of DNWR and DRWR for the period 2001-2004. By
construction, all these measure vary between zero and one, where zero indicates perfect
￿ exibility and one indicates full rigidity. As expected, the simple measures increase after
the error correction. The ￿gure also shows that MMM estimates provide similar results
to the simple measures, with a somewhat higher DNWR and a somewhat lower DRWR.
These di⁄erences are in line with the rigidity measures obtained for other countries.
Overall, nominal rigidity appears to be more important in Hungary than real rigid-
ity. Estimate of the fraction of workers potentially a⁄ected by downward nominal wage
rigidity is on average 0.344 while the average downward real rigidity estimate is 0.097.
The estimated rigidity measures are not completely stable over time: real rigidity is
somewhat higher at the beginning of the period when price in￿ ation was higher whereas
14For 2003, I used the sum of the realized CPI in￿ ation and the agreed real wage growth as the proxy
for the bargained nominal wage and I set the threshold to ￿1%p. Of course, results obtained for this
year have to be treated with great caution.18
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nominal rigidity increases to some extent with decreasing in￿ ation. While the variation
in the measures and their correlation with the actual in￿ ation rate go against the as-
sumptions and the purpose of the MMM estimation method, the variance is limited and
does not a⁄ect the qualitative interpretation of the results. Di⁄erences from one year to
another are more likely due to estimation error than to any change in workers￿resistance
to nominal and real wage cuts.
When compared to other countries participating in the IWFP, Hungary ranks among
the countries with the lowest degree of DRWR (see Figure 5). The estimated downward
nominal rigidity for Hungary is higher, the measure is close to the overall cross-country
average. As predicted by institutional characteristics and previous empirical research
on wage ￿ exibility, such combination of very low real rigidity and moderate nominal
rigidity places Hungary among countries with relatively high wage ￿ exibility. However,
the estimated measures say nothing about the speci￿c wage component through which
the adjustment takes place. Survey results suggest that base wage is generally rigid and
employers use regular and irregular bonuses to adjust labour costs to shocks (see KØzdi
and K￿nya (2010) for details). Unfortunately it is not possible to di⁄erentiate di⁄erent
wage components in the database I use so this issue cannot be investigated.
5.2 National-level bargained wage
Results are presented in Figure 6: the continuing lines show the average wage growth
(red), the median wage growth (grey) and the modus of the wage change distributions.
The black horizontal segments are the mean wage increases recommended by O￿T, the
corresponding vertical segments denote the bargained thresholds and the bars represent
the estimated probability of being subject to downward wage rigidity due to the bar-
gained wage. Results con￿rm the widespread view that the wage growth bargained at the
national level has little compulsory power in Hungary: with the exception of 2001, the
estimated proportion of workers being subject to downward rigidity due to the bargained
wage is below 3%, i.e. basically zero. In 2001, the bargained wage was presumably too
close to the realized in￿ ation to distinguish between real downward wage rigidity and the
in￿ uence of the bargained wage increase. Nevertheless, even the result for 2001 indicates
the lack of signi￿cant concentration of observations around the bargaining focal point.
It is important to note, however, that this does not necessarily mean that O￿T has
no any in￿ uence on ￿rms￿wage decisions. Even if the collective wage agreements do not19
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seem to inhibit low wage increases it is still possible that the outcome of the tripartite
negotiations guides ￿rms in their wage decisions.
5.3 Minimum wage
The simplest way to capture the importance and the e⁄ectiveness of the minimum wage
in a country is to look at (1) the Kaitz index (de￿ned as the ratio of the minimum wage
to average wage) and (2) the share of the workforce paid at the minimum wage. The
Kaitz index was very low in Hungary prior to the two disproportionate rises in minimum
wage in 2001-2002, when it increased dramatically from around 30% to 43% in just two
years. The following years, smaller-scale increases in the minimum wage reduced the
index below 40%. This ratio cannot be considered as excessive as it is still below the
OECD average (see ￿gure 7).
On the other hand, the share of workers earning the minimum wage is very high in
Hungary. According to Eurostat data, proportion of full-time employees with earnings
on the minimum wage is relatively high in Hungary in international comparison (8%).
The picture is even worse if we include small ￿rms with less than 4 employees and
part-time employees.15 Di⁄erent estimates for the ratio of minimum wage earners over
total employment range between 22% in Elek et al. (2008) and 30% in Krek￿ and Kiss
(2007). Comparing the o¢ cial Eurostat statistics with the income tax returns, Krek￿
and Kiss (2007) conclude that around 70% of the employees in small ￿rms and self-
employees are declared at the minimum wage. As Krek￿ and Kiss (2007) could not
separate employees who have not worked during the whole year, this latter proportion
is likely to overestimate the share of minimum wage earners.
The uncertainty surrounding the e⁄ects of the minimum wage is further aggravated as
there is no consensus about the true number of workers employed at the minimum wage.
If employees declared at the minimum wage are remunerated higher, the adjustment to
earnings may be conducted through the undeclared part of the income in which case
the minimum wage is not truly binding. On the other hand, downward wage rigidity
engendered by the minimum wage is particularly important for workers actually paid at
the minimum wage.
15The Hungarian part of the Eurostat data is based on ￿rms with more than or equal to 5 employees.20
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6 Conclusion
Following the approach recently developed for the International Wage Flexibility Project
(IWFP), the paper discusses new estimates of downward real and nominal wage rigidity
for Hungary. The estimated measures indicate the fractions of workers who are poten-
tially subject to downward nominal and downward real wage rigidity, i.e. the fraction
of those who would received nominal or real wage freeze instead of nominal or real wage
cut in the absence of rigidity.
Results suggest that nominal rigidity is more prominent in Hungary than real rigidity.
When compared to other countries participating in the IWFP, Hungary ranks among
the countries with the lowest degree of downward real rigidity. The estimated downward
nominal rigidity for Hungary is higher, the measure is close to but still below the overall
cross-country average.
The paper also con￿rms the widespread view that the wage growth bargained at
the national level has little compulsory power in Hungary: the estimated proportion of
workers being subject to downward rigidity due to the bargained wage is close to zero.
On the other hand, the minimum wage is an important source of potential downward
wage rigidity: although at the time of writing the paper, the level of the minimum wage
in Hungary cannot be considered as excessive, the share of the workforce earning below
or close to the minimum wage is very high in international comparison.21
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
2001 2002 2003 2004
Mean wage change 0.143 0.132 0.112 0.070
S.d. of wage changes 0.195 0.195 0.197 0.199
Fraction of wage cuts 0.114 0.116 0.169 0.205
Fraction of nominal wage freeze 0.016 0.019 0.042 0.039
Mean wage cut -0.138 -0.131 -0.114 -0.190
Mean wage increase 0.189 0.178 0.174 0.148
Mean wage change 0.145 0.135 0.115 0.070
S.d. of wage changes 0.151 0.127 0.151 0.161
Fraction of wage cuts 0.067 0.065 0.115 0.148
Fraction of nominal wage freeze 0.021 0.025 0.055 0.051
Mean wage cut -0.107 -0.078 -0.048 -0.158
Mean wage increase 0.171 0.158 0.149 0.120
Inflation rate 0.092 0.053 0.047 0.068
VA growth* 0.044 0.041 0.040 0.064




￿￿Source: Social Security database, 2000-2004 and CSO24
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￿Source: the ￿gures for Belgium, Denmark, Portugal and Spain are from (Messina et al
(2009), for Luxembourg are from L￿nnemann and Wintr (2009), and the rest are IWFP
￿gures from Dickens et al (2007). The measures from Dickens et al (2007) are simple
measures from empirical distributions while those from the other papers are model based
and have been corrected for measurement error.28
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